Wednesday, February 7, 2007

(E&A) Contemplation of Thesis & Topic limitations

I bring this to the round-table-of-open-discussion so that I'm not keeping all my research to myself, and also in the hopes that other people might help to dispell some of the fog that (seemingly) permeates my topic of interest for the research paper...

Okay, so here's my original idea: I propose to research whether or not there are any non-human animals that are 'consciously moral', or moral agents.

However, the topic itself strikes me as being too broad. While I am inclined to limit the research to just primates (those non-human animals closest to the humans in the classification system), I am also aware that other creatures (i.e. dolphins) exhibit behaviors that might be 'consciously moral'. And I'd hate to leave anyone out!

Preliminary Thesis (based on original idea): There are non-human animals that are capable of being moral agents -- that is, non-human animals exhibit behaviors that are not simply a reaction to external stimulus (tropism), but rather are evidence of cognitive awareness resulting in conscious decisions. (For a sharpening of focus, I'd exchange of 'non-human animals' for primates.)


However, Matt brought to my attention that linguistics is really where the debate of non-human animals being 'moral agents' is.

Linguistics, without even doing a search, is going to be a *huge* field to try and wade through. Even after searching through tables of contents of various books, I don't know how to limit the search -- pick one species and begin?

It strikes me that behavior is necessarily included in linguistics, if the primary function of linguistics is communication. (Arguably, humans communicate both verbally and physically with gestures and facial expressions.)

So, I'm currently at a loss of where or how to start in regards to a thesis statement. I've checked several books out from the library, and shall peruse them to see if anything pops out. I've a very broad and general knowledge of this area -- indeed, it's in blob form, which makes it very hard to "carve off corners", as Matt puts it.


Comparison of Human language and Animal Communicatons

(several 'differences' I knee-jerkingly disagree with)

When Apes speak, linguists listen
(.pdf file from .edu site)

Formal Linguistics and precursors to Animal Syntax

(.pdf file from .edu site -- this one looks to be of the utmost importance to this topic, but at first glance... it's written in Chinese. I shall print it up and study it further.)

Lingformant - The science of linguistics in the news

(appears to be an updated blog with *many* juicy articles...)

animalvoice.com

(a page of links on various non-human animal topics)


Obviously there's a lot more out there, but that's what I've garnered from my 'selective dredging'...

As always, I shall keep this updated as I research, including interesting tidbits from actual books! =-)

7 comments:

David K. Braden-Johnson said...

I'm not convinced (sorry Matt!) that you ought to turn to linguistics for clarification.

You write: "There are non-human animals that are capable of being moral agents -- that is, non-human animals exhibit behaviors that are not simply a reaction to external stimulus (tropism), but rather are evidence of cognitive awareness resulting in conscious decisions."

The capacity for moral agency (your first phrase above), contrary to what you suggest (following the words "that is"), is not equivalent to "exhibit[ing] behaviors that are not simply a reaction... but evidence of cognitive awareness resulting in conscious activity."

Rather, the capicity for moral agency requires the degree of cognitive awareness you mention (affording proactive choices) and then some, namely, the capacity consistently and impartially to consider relevantly similar interests and to have one's choices appropriately shaped by such considerations.

Once you are clear about the nature of moral agency (a philosophical question), questions about which animals have the requisite level of conscious awareness seem to belong to animal ethology.

Diseria / Tanya said...

"Rather, the capicity for moral agency requires the degree of cognitive awareness you mention (affording proactive choices) and then some, namely, the capacity consistently and impartially to consider relevantly similar interests and to have one's choices appropriately shaped by such considerations."

But isn't it behavior and linguistics that what we'd (or rather Animal Ethologists) be studying?


...If deciding which animals are moral agents belongs to animal ethology, then it's hardly a philosophical question then, eh?

dang.


Well, I shall trudge back to the drawing board...

David K. Braden-Johnson said...

You write: "But isn't it behavior and linguistics that what we'd (or rather Animal Ethologists) be studying?"

Yes, of course, but in light of a proper understanding of moral agency. My only point above was that possession of the mere capacity consciously to make choices was necessary though insufficient for moral agency. So, rather than stearing you clear of your thesis, I'm hoping only to redirect it so that agency, and not mere sentience, is your focus.

You write, further: "...If deciding which animals are moral agents belongs to animal ethology, then it's hardly a philosophical question then, eh?"

The philosophical question distinguishes the very concepts of "mere sentience" and "moral agency." Then, and only then, can animal ethology help to locate candidates for each category.

Diseria / Tanya said...

Okay, so now I'm curious where to 'draw the line' so to speak (since lines always seem to be drawn, even if they are later moved)...

In order to discern moral agency, I must understand what it means to _be_ a moral agent, and how that can/might carry over to the animal kingdom.

However, I do not think that I can use various behaviors/linguistics as actual reasons for claiming moral agency, but rather as an example?

I think I confused myself (again -- I've been doing that _A LOT_ lately... and the further confusion is that I can't decide if it's a good thing or not!)...

Okay, say that my cat exhibits characteristic X (whatever that is), and X is on my list of claims to an animal being a moral agent. X would not be a reason in and of itself, but rather an example that works towards the claim's validity...?

I ask because this question determines what books I'm searching through - animal behavior/linguistics, or philosophical debates about sentience verses moral agency. (With my luck, it'll probably be both...)


Methinks I picked a whopper of a topic... (I'm really good at that... so at least I'm consistent in this particular aspect, which seems oddly reassuring...)

David K. Braden-Johnson said...

You might employ both sorts of texts; the one (philosophical) to determine the nature and scope of moral agency, the other (scientific, linguistic) to pick out exemplars of the capacities identified in the first.

Your cat having trait x is evidence for its moral agency if, generally, the having of x is sufficient for moral agency. (It may simply be a necessary condition that requires others jointly to become sufficient to specify an instance of moral agency.)

Diseria / Tanya said...

This is kind of a dosey to ask, but in light of my recent, stressful 'life-style changes' (so to speak), might I have the ability to opt out of the essay at some later point?

Right now, I have full intentions of continuing on with the work for this essay, but I must admit that my focus as of late hasn't been entirely 'in place' with regards to school...

I ask this so that in the event that life decidedly becomes *more* stressful, I have the option of an out... (I see this, quite clearly, as a least wanted and entirely last resort option.)

David K. Braden-Johnson said...

Yes, of course you have the option of opting out of an optional additional course requirement!