Friday, February 2, 2007

'Ought-Is' is confusing me... and it ought not to!

*laughs* ((I'm sorry, but the title cracked me up when I thought it up...))


Seriously though, I'm confused. This might be a product of an incomplete study of logic... maybe I just simply haven't gotten there yet...

I'm starting from nuts and bolts. (...and I think I lost some of the nuts, but I won't know until it falls apart...)


Okay. A normative statement, according to Wikipedia (not the best source, but it's a place to start)

...a normative statement expresses a judgment about whether a situation is desirable or undesirable. "The world would be a better place if the moon were made of green cheese" is a normative statement because it expresses a judgment about what ought to be. Notice that there is no way of disproving this statement. If you disagree with it, you have no sure way of convincing someone who believes the statement that he or she is wrong.

Maybe the example confused me (I mean, how can that not be wrong?? a) we'd probably eat ourselves out of planet and home, b) everyone would be constipated from too much cheese *laughs* c) the whole world would stink, d) I'm fairly certain that cheese does not make a good foundation for the buildings we've managed to build... (maybe really old parmesean or romano might work...) How can a normative statement not be disproven??), but working with that definition alone -- if I decided debated my boyfriend about meat-eating and evolution of the brain, I would be fighting a losing battle. If there's no sure way of convincing someone otherwise, then how would one go about convincing?

Someplace in my brain, that made sense. Problem is that I cannot re-explain it to myself, so I did not consciously understand what I just read.

Another attempt yielded an explanation from answers.com:

(excerpt) ((Note: links in this quote do not work))
In philosophy, normative is usually contrasted with positive, descriptive or explanatory when describing types of theories, beliefs, or statements. Descriptive (or constative) statements are falsifiable statements that attempt to describe reality. Normative statements, on the other hand, affirm how things should or ought to be, how to value them, which things are good or bad, which actions are right or wrong.


Methinks this might be the easiest way to begin broaching the different statements... However, Wikipedia (of course) doesn't go further into the descriptions that I'm looking for... harumph.

Positive statements vs. Normative statements

from everything2.com (one would think there'd be a zillion philosophy sites explaining this...)
(excerpt) ((Again, links in quote don't work))
A statement that tells you what should be done. These are specifically statements used in ethical contexts, where a statement may not be measurably true or false in any objective sense, but is still used as if it gives useful information.


If this is true, then at least 'meat-eating is essential to human brain evolution' is a subjective sentence?? ...that doesn't seem right. It can be empirically proven (or so people keep trying to tell me...).

The statement is not true or false... and yet it seems that such a statement could be nothing but true or false... *puzzled look*


Continuing on my search, I found a paper by Professor Johnson =-) The Ought-Is Question: Discovering the Modern in Post -Modernism
(excerpt)

1. The Is-Ought (Ought-Is) Question

According to tradition, to "get from is to ought" (and, presumably, from ought to is) means to deduce an ought-conclusion from exclusively is-premises. Let us use getD to indicate this standard (deductive) interpretation. It is a relatively simple matter to show that any substantive is-ought (or ought-is) controversy must limit itself to this interpretation. Consider the effects of loosening the connection from strict entailment (that is, getD) to any type of nondeductive inference or explanation:

(1) One should avoid hitting others because hitting is potentially dangerous.

No one denies that statements of fact and value are often combined or associated, as one serves as evidence for, explains, or determines (in some nonreductive sense2) the other. (1) is a perfectly sensible assertion, where the projection of possibly harmful consequences of certain acts serves as a reason for concluding that those acts ought to be avoided. That is, we can getND (in some nondeductive sense) to that conclusion. But, construed as a deductive inference, the is-ought problem is obvious:

(2) Hitting is potentially dangerous (an is-statement).

(3) Therefore, one should avoid hitting others (an ought-statement).

Now (3) follows from (2) only given (at least) the additional evaluative premise (2'): One should avoid doing things that are potentially dangerous. That is, one cannot without some further premise getD from (2) to (3). The logic is the same, though more obvious still, if we reverse the movement from ought to is: The moral imperative "one should avoid hitting others," though clearly dependent for its meaningfulness on some understanding of factual matters, does not entail that hitting is potentially dangerous (or any other purely factual claim). In our present case (paraphrasing Siegel's depiction of Weinstein's thinking) we have:

(4) Dialogue ought to be conducted in conditions of full access and equal respect (an "ought-statement").

(5) Therefore, agreements and conclusions reached in dialogue not conducted in conditions of full access and equal respect are less likely to be true (an "is-statement") (GO, p. 18).

This, too, fails as a deduction, since we cannot getD from (4) to (5) without the assistance of (at least) one further premise acting to link the evaluative element of (4) with the factual results outlined in (5).3 Of course, the results will be the same for all "postmodern" attempts to getD from ought to is; while efforts simply to getND from ought to is are not a source of controversy for either Siegel or Weinstein.



Someplace in my brain, that made sense. Problem is that I cannot re-explain it to myself, so I did not consciously understand what I just read. I'm starting to think that a) this involves more grammar than I know (which, I'm ashamed to say, is truly miniscule), and b) this involves logic that I simply haven't gotten to yet.

I'm starting to understand that if I'm to give a logical argument, I cannot leave anything out. (That which is 'accepted as common knowledge' is not so common -- I got strange looks (arguably not uncommon by themselves) for not knowing that Denver, Colorado has an elevation of 1 mile.)



I also found The Origins of Morality, which is a blurb that, again, I almost understood.
In addition to Moore's Naturalistic Fallacy, there was another issue to be had with the evolutionary ethics of Darwin and Spencer, namely the “ought-is” problem. David Hume brought up this problem, addressing the sudden, unexplained jump from “is” to “ought” in moral systems. To say what is the case and to say what ought to be the case are two unrelated matters, according to him. On the one hand, empirical facts do not contain normative statements, or else they would not be purely empirical. On the other hand, if there are no normative elements in the facts, they cannot just suddenly surface in the conclusions because a conclusion is only deductively valid if all necessary information is present in the premises. (Hume) Darwin commits this ill when he writes that "happiness is an essential part of the general good." He jumps from “is” statements to “ought” statements in order to make his hedonistic claim. Spencer does the exact same thing, with his equation of evolutionary progress with good. Thomas Huxely puts it well when he writes- “The thief and the murderer follow nature just as much as the philanthropist. Cosmic evolution may teach us how the good and the evil tendencies of man may have come about; but, in itself, it is incompetent to furnish any better reason why what we call good is preferable to what we call evil than we had before.” (Huxley)


The quote at the end is great, but I refuse to use it until I understand this 'Ought-Is/Is-Ought' thing.

'Ought' seems to indicate a suggestion: One should not stand under a ladder.
'Is' seems to indicate a declarative statement, a fact, something provable: Person X weighs 500lbs.

So, if I say 'You shouldn't stand under the ladder because Person X (who is assumedly on the ladder) weighs 500lbs', the statement is incomplete because I haven't given the condition of the ladder...?

P. Person X weighs 500lbs and is standing at the top of the ladder.
P. The ladder is wooden and old (ready to collapse)
----
C. You should not stand under the ladder.

Does that work? If not, why not?

I know that I'm missing something... but what?

. o O (Uh oh... the first sign of old age -- knowing that you are missing something, but you've forgotten what it was... oh boy and oy vay...)

6 comments:

David K. Braden-Johnson said...

Your posts are refreshingly insightful and scholarly.

You write:

P. Person X weighs 500lbs and is standing at the top of the ladder.
P. The ladder is wooden and old (ready to collapse)
----
C. You should not stand under the ladder.

As it stands, the inference is a strong, if enthymemic, induction (C is more likely than not to be true given the evidence cited in your Ps). As a deduction (GetD, in my essay above), it requires several additional premises to motivate (completely -- in a deductive fashion) the "should" in the conclusion, perhaps along these lines:

P3: The ladder certainly won't hold 500 lbs; and
P4: You risk injury standing beneath the ladder; and
P4: You care not to risk injury by standing beneath the ladder.

The problem with the Wikipedia entry is that its author confuses the "Is-ought" gap (the logical relations between normative and descriptive claims) with the provability of normative claims (an entirely different question). "Murder is a good thing," is clearly false. The sorts of claims it might follow from in a deductive setting is the focus of the is-ought controversy.

dkj

Diseria / Tanya said...

So, in order for any move from 'ought' to 'is', the argument must be deductive -- the move must be _necessary_, no other conclusion can be drawn from the premises. (A strong inductive argument leaves room for other possibilities, and it doesn't make the move necessary. And a move from 'is' to 'ought' or vice versa must be necessary because one cannot prescribe actions to another without them being undoubtedly necessary...)


So to prove the conclusion 'meat-eating is necessary for evolution of the human brain', there can be absolutely no doubt in the argument...

Evolution still stands as a theory... even if it's commonly accepted as 'fact'. (We must be able to correctly predict the next evolution/mutation of the human species before it can be accepted.) Therefore, any statement about evolution is normative...

If that's the case, then it seems to me that the real argument that needs to happen regards the common acceptance of evolution as _theory_, not law. Once that is accepted, then the following argument (meat-eating for evolution of brain) will be much easier for people to understand and accept.

(This will be tricky, because I remember being taught that evolution was taught as fact, therefore I, and my classmates, accepted it as fact. The only debate that every really happened was between evolutionists and creationists...)

David K. Braden-Johnson said...

"So to prove the conclusion 'meat-eating is necessary for evolution of the human brain', there can be absolutely no doubt in the argument..."

Only for deductions. One might choose to infer inductively to that conclusion as well (though most dicussions of the "is-ought" gap involve deduction alone; and ethics generally involves more deductions than inductions).

Evolution may be a theory (rather than fact), but that doesn't make it normative, just fallible or incomplete (as all or most science is). (Note, for example, that evolutionary biologists don't say "evolution describes the way things ought to be." Rather, it desribes the ways things are or at least seem to be (a theory).)

Show me the promised inference to that conclusion, and I'll comment further.

Diseria / Tanya said...

hrm. I did not give an actual argument for my conclusion, but rather was speaking in general-type terms. But, I shall practice my newly acquired logic and play Devil's Advocate! :D

(The majority of these premises are taken from 'Meat-eating is essential for human evolution')

P1:Meat supplied early humans not only with all the essential amino acids, but also with many vitamins, minerals and other nutrients they required.

P2:The human brain needs calories (in the form of glucose) to continuously function.

P3:Meat provided early humans with the means/energy to find plants to provide those calories (in the form of carbohydrates).

P4:While plants are the main source of the human brain evolution (!!!), early humans were unable to secure plants as a stable food source.

P5:Weaned infants cannot process plant material, and therefore derive their nutrients and energy from meat.

P6:If the children were malnourished, with underdeveloped brains, then the early humans would not have survived.
______
C: Meat-eating is essential for the evolution of the human brain.


....I think I just proved my (Devil's advocate) self wrong.. *laughs*

So, it's not that meat was necessary for the actual evolution, but rather necessary as a secure food source so that plants could be included in the diet -- the plants actually being the catalyst for human brain evolution...

That brings us full-circle to the 'ought-is' issue. (Which, isn't even an issue in this particular topic, if meat *alone* was not responsible for the human brain's evolution....)


..Will we be returning to Silliman's book, specifically the chapter concerning 'ought-is'? If not, which chapter is it? Properly combining your essay and Matt's chapter, I might get a better understanding of the dynamics of this issue. :)

Diseria / Tanya said...

P.S. Between P2 to P3, there should be the supressed premise that carbohydrates provide the necessary glucose...

David K. Braden-Johnson said...

At best, the argument proves that meat-eating played some role in the evolution of the human brain. It is entirely silent on the merits -- moral and physiological -- of meat-eating for contemporary humans.

Furthermore, understood as a justification for contemporary practices, the inference appears to violate the "is-ought" gap (in this case, in the form of "was-ought"):

1. Meat was required for the full development of the human brain (an is (or was) claim;
2. Therefore, is is morally okay to eat meat (an ought claim).

Or, reduced to their basic essence:

This is the way the world was; therefore, this is the way it ought to be.

A clearly invalid argument form.